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“Stoicism,” as Massimo Pigliucci informs us in a synoptic 
overview of its recent resurgence both inside and outside academia, “is 
back.”1 After a hiatus roughly corresponding to the triumph and 
abatement of Christianity in the West, Stoicism has been gaining 
ground on the heels of a resurgent virtue ethics research program. 
Professional philosophers, save for neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists and 
those few specialists in Hellenistic philosophy, may have had little to 
do with its upsurge in mainstream culture, but it would be unwise, we 
are told, to brush it aside as just another intellectual fad. As Pigliucci 
exhorts in his lead article, philosophers have a duty to “take notice, 
understand, and insofar as it is possible, contribute to the increasing 
interest in practical philosophy, of which modern Stoicism is but one 
manifestation.”2  
 I welcome both the challenge to help broaden interest in 
practical philosophy within academia and the invitation to consider—
or rather, reconsider—what Stoicism has to offer denizens of the global 
post-industrial West, though I will limit my comments to the latter. 
Specifically, I want to examine the relation between virtue and 
power—captured by what I take to be the most salient and fundamental 
of Stoic principles, namely, that some things are up to us and some are 
beyond our control––and see what the contemporary embrace of 
                                                          
1 Massimo Pigliucci, “Toward the Fifth Stoa: The Return of Virtue Ethics,” 
Reason Papers 40, no. 1 (Summer 2018), pp. 14–30, quotation at p. 14. Also 
see Massimo Pigliucci, How to Be a Stoic: Using Ancient Philosophy to Live a 
Modern Life (New York: Basic Books, 2017). 
2 Pigliucci, “Toward the Fifth Stoa,” p. 14. 
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revisionary metaphysics3 means for the modern Stoic’s conception of 
living according to nature.  As Epictetus himself so eloquently puts it, 
“Some things are within our power, while others are not. Within our 
power are opinion, motivation, desire, aversion, and, in a word, 
whatever is of our own doing; not within our power are our body, our 
property, reputation, office, and, in a word, whatever is not of our own 
doing.”4 This principle, which Pigliucci labels “the dichotomy of 
control,” reflects a certain ambivalence about power and the human 
capacity to effect change whatever the goal may be (e.g., overcoming 
hubris or just cultivating a serene disposition).  
                                                          
3 Since Peter F. Strawson first introduced the phrase, “revisionary 
metaphysics” has been conceived (in opposition to “descriptive 
metaphysics”), as a project concerned with producing a better structure of the 
world than “the actual structure of our thought about the world”; see Peter 
Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London: 
Metheun, 1959), p. 9. One way to understand revisionary metaphysics, then, is 
as a project concerned with “what the structure of reality would be if it were 
accurately mirrored in the conceptual scheme we ought to have”; see Uriah 
Kriegel, “The Epistemological Challenge of Revisionary Metaphysics,” 
Philosophers’ Imprint 13, no. 12 (June 2013), pp. 1-30, quotation at p. 1. 
Since studying the world’s real structure preoccupies most metaphysicians 
today, it is revisionary rather than descriptive metaphysics that dominates 
most debates in ontology and cosmology (even as most metaphysicians 
eschew this nomenclature). Indeed, Frank Jackson’s sustained and influential 
defense of the relevance of conceptual analysis to serious metaphysics 
(conceived as the task of providing a “comprehensive account of some 
subject-matter—the mind, the semantic, or, most ambitiously, everything—in 
terms of a limited number of more or less basic notions”) is just one example 
of how revisionary (or “serious”) metaphysics makes explicit what is implicit 
in a given (scientific) theory of the world; see Frank Jackson, From 
Metaphysics to Ethics (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
p. 4. More overt examples of such an undertaking, in this case centered on the 
metaphysics of personal identity, are found in Carol Rovane’s The Bounds of 
Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1998) and Galen Strawson’s Selves: An Essay in 
Revisionary Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), both of 
which, as their subtitles announce, are conceived as “an essay in revisionary 
metaphysics.” 
 
4 Epictetus, Enchiridion, 1.1, in Epictetus: Discourses, Fragments, Handbook, 
trans. Robin Hard (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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 Clearly, insofar as we are capable of exercising any kind of 
agency, whether in thought or deed, the Stoics must be right that some 
things are going to be under our control (our opinions, judgments, and 
so on) while others are going to be outside of our control (how others 
feel and think about us). The question of control, however, depends not 
simply on the capacity to recognize what is and what is not up to us, 
but on a deeper metaphysical question about agency. Pigliucci rightly 
identifies some of the roadblocks a modern Stoic might face when 
confronting the problem of agency, but, as I will argue, he downplays 
their importance. We may well be able, as he says, to “retain a 
meaningful sense of living according to nature”5 by interpreting the 
Stoic concept of nature to mean follow the facts, and the concept of 
human nature to mean our sociality and capacity to reason. In doing 
so, though, we assume an unproblematic assimilation of (the Stoic 
conception of) nature to facts about our biology and psychology, in 
particular of biological nature to the findings of evolutionary biology 
and behavioral genetics and of moral nature to the empirical facts and 
hypotheses of moral psychology. 
 It seems plausible to assume that, at the most basic level, 
choice is deeply embedded in mechanisms that regulate our capacity to 
discriminate and form judgments, and that some causal explanation is 
in order if we are to make sense of what it means to live according to 
nature. However, causal explanation is no substitute for understanding 
what it is about our capacity to choose that makes us moral agents,6 
given that what makes an action moral (and thus praiseworthy) is the 
agent’s autonomy––in particular the autonomy of practical reason7––
and hence her responsiveness to reasons.8 As I have argued elsewhere, 
                                                          
5 Pigliucci, “Toward the Fifth Stoa,” p. 23. 
 
6 Choice, unlike the sort of automatic heuristic-based processes that 
characterize our perceptual engagement with situations and things, is a 
demanding, time-consuming, and resource-intensive operation that 
presupposes some measure of deliberation and the weighing of alternative 
possibilities before action is finally undertaken; cf. Richard Holton, Willing, 
Wanting, Waiting (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009), p. 57.  
 
7 Elizabeth Anderson, “Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods,” in 
Incommensurability, Incompatibility, and Practical Reason, ed. Ruth Chang 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 90-109, quotation at p. 
92. 
 
8 In discussing the varieties of autonomy (e.g., self-control, power in the 
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moral agency is a type of achievement that comes with learning the 
norms of ethical conduct. The norms themselves are not traceable to 
specifically neurobiological mechanisms and processes, although, once 
learned, they would have their neural correlates when enacted.9  
 Pigliucci is in broad agreement with Lawrence Becker that the 
Stoic’s moral reasoning, which has been reduced to “practical 
reasoning all-things-considered,”10 can survive without the teleological 
physics and biology that put classical Stoicism at odds with the modern 
scientific consensus. Does this stripped down, bare-bones Stoicism 
without metaphysical beliefs suffice for canvassing a conception of 
moral agency robust enough to serve as a guide for living well? How 
exactly can the modern Stoic face the dilemmas of modern life without 
appealing to some special-purpose point of view (e.g., law, efficiency, 
care, prudence)? That is, beyond the broadly shared idea that, as 
Pigliucci puts it, “we thrive in social groups and . . . are capable of 
reason,”11 how do we know when our employ of reason has improved 
social living and engendered our flourishing? Without belaboring the 
point, my concern is that the dilemmas of modern life (e.g., life-style 
choices in the face of climate change, epistemic trust in a science that 
is not entirely value-free, striving for justice in an unequal world) 
demand not less but more scrutiny of the Stoic’s moral and 
metaphysical norms. The main issue, as I see it, is whether the modern 
Stoic can heed Epictetus’s warning that attributing “freedom to things 
                                                                                                                              
world, psychological independence, having moral rights, authenticity), Nomy 
Arpaly thinks that Stoic ataraxia is best understood as a kind of “heroic 
autonomy,” since ideally only the Stoic sage would exhibit the capacity to act 
such that externals or indifferents (adiaphora) (e.g., wealth, fame, education) 
exercise no influence, though some indifferents are preferred (e.g., health) 
while others are not (e.g., poverty); see Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue: 
An Inquiry into Moral Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 
124.  
 
9 Christian Coseru, “Breaking Good: Moral Agency, Neuroethics, and the 
Spontaneity of Compassion,” in A Mirror Is for Reflection: Understanding 
Buddhist Ethics, ed. Jake Davis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 
pp. 109-30; see esp. p. 111. 
10 Lawrence Becker, A New Stoicism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2013), p. 117. 
 
11 Pigliucci, “Toward the Fifth Stoa,” p. 23. 
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by nature dependent” and taking “what belongs to others for your 
own”12 can be a source of distress without acquiescing to social 
injustice or falling prey to a false consciousness.  
 The new sciences of human nature where the modern Stoic 
seeks, and claims to find, ground for action, also tell us, among other 
things, that human behavioral traits are heritable, that the effects of 
nurture are smaller than those of our genes, and that much of the 
variation in human behavior is accountable in terms of neither genetic 
inheritance nor family rearing conditions.13 Neither my genetic 
programming nor my family upbringing is within my power. The 
evidence from behavioral genetic research also suggests, though, that 
much of who we are (and are capable of) is determined by our unique 
experiences.14 One’s familial and social environments may constrain 
the range of opinions that one can form, just as one’s genetic 
inheritance may determine whether or not piano lessons at an early age 
are going to disclose a musical prodigy. However, it is one’s unique 
experiences (a lasting childhood friendship, an accident, or a chance 
encounter with an influential mentor) that in the end push the boundary 
of what is possible.  
 If the modern Stoic’s conception of living according to nature 
is follow the facts, then these findings in particular make it harder to 
hold onto the dichotomy-of-control model. Just as the cultural and 
social revolutions of the modern era brought forth new forms of human 
expression, gene replacement therapy may one day alter the extent to 
which our physical and intellectual abilities are constrained by our 
biological inheritance. For the modern Stoic, follow the facts may 
mean that nothing is entirely under our control just as nothing is 
entirely beyond it. Rather, things are more or less within my power, 
depending on the range of possibilities that living in accordance with a 
constantly evolving conception of nature affords. 
                                                          
12 Epictetus, Enchiridion, 1.3, in Epictetus: Discourses, Fragments, 
Handbook. 
 
13 Jonathan Flint, Ralph Greenspan, and Kenneth Kendler, How Genes 
Influence Behavior (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), chap. 11. 
 
14 David Moore, The Developing Genome: An Introduction to Behavioral 
Epigenetics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 155f. 
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 What does this mean for the pursuit of virtue? Classical 
Stoicism holds that one cannot be in between virtue and vice. Like a 
stick, which must be either straight or crooked, “so a man must be 
either just or unjust, but not either more just or more unjust, and 
likewise with the other virtues.”15 This view had already come under 
close scrutiny in antiquity, though. As Alexander of Aphrodisias 
remarks in On Fate, “‘If,’ they [the Stoics] say, ‘those things are in our 
power of which we are also capable of the opposites,’ and it is to such 
cases that praise and blame and encouragements and discouragements 
and punishments and rewards are given, being prudent and having the 
virtues will not be in the power of those who have them, since they are 
no longer capable of receiving the vices which are opposite to the 
virtues.”16 What does this mean for the Stoic conception of virtue as 
identical with rationality and as a vehicle for the normative 
propositions of practical reason?      
 The implication of a conception of virtue as rooted in nature is 
that vice becomes in some sense unnatural, a product of unreason 
rather than a natural inclination. If this is the case, then prudence and 
virtue are no longer within our power since we could not in principle 
have done otherwise. This picture of human agency, which pitted 
classical Stoicism against the Greek tragedians, is now also at odds 
with a great deal of empirical research that regards traditional views of 
human rationality as flawed.17 Against the Socratic dictum that “none 
of the wise men considers that anybody ever willingly errs,”18 which 
provides inspiration for the Stoic conception of moral purpose 
(prohairesis), Aeschylus paints an akratic picture of human nature 
when he has Prometheus declare: “Of my own will, yes, of my own 
                                                          
15 Diogenes Laertius, 7.127, in A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic 
Philosophers, Vol. I (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 
380. 
 
16 Alexander, On Fate, 196.24-197.3, in Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic 
Philosophers, p. 381. 
 
17 Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human 
Brain (New York: Penguin Books, 1994). 
 
18 Plato, Protagoras, 345d, in Plato: Gorgias, Meno, Protagoras, ed. Malcolm 
Schofield, trans. T. Griffith (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2010). 
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will I erred—I will not deny it.”19 If critics of the rationalist traditions 
in Western thought are correct, then moral failure cannot be due to an 
intellectual error alone. Contrary to Chrysippus’s view that “the 
impulse of man is reason prescribing action to him,”20 the passions 
(anger, shame, dread, etc.) are upheavals of thought rather than 
rational movements.     
The modern Stoic may reject this Promethean upending of 
human reason or insist that desires, so long as they are thoughtful 
(orexix dianoētikē) and do not exceed the bounds of reason, are within 
our power (e.g., I can give up meat and walk to work, and encourage 
others to do the same without despairing or getting angry when they 
don’t). Either way, the question of power remains a central concern.  
First, power itself is a relational concept. This means that both 
those things that are said to be under my control (e.g., my opinions) 
and those that are not (e.g., the weather) are relative to what I am 
capable of. For example, my opinions reflect ways of seeing and habits 
of mind that I can reflect on, but also whose underlying mechanisms I 
don’t fully understand, let alone control. Similarly, while I may not be 
able to control the weather, my ability to find shelter, built a camp fire, 
or adjust the thermostat represent ways in which I can wrest some 
measure of control over my immediate environment. Even though 
there are limits to my physical and intellectual abilities, I can jump 
higher and sing better if I am in peak shape. This relational view of 
power, according to Pigliucci, has led interpreters such as Donald 
Robertson to propose a trichotomy-of-control model,21 since a great 
many things are just partially under our control (e.g., exercise and a 
healthy diet is one way to have some control over one’s body). The 
better we understand the natural world, the more we are able to control 
its impact on us: we build dams to control flooding, advance 
epidemiology to prevent disease outbreaks, and maximize well-being 
for working people through social welfare programs. Second, the 
findings of contemporary cognitive science seem to restrict the scope 
                                                          
19 Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, trans. Deborah H. Roberts (Indianapolis, 
IN: Hackett Publishing, 2012), p. 265. 
 
20 Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, 1037f, in Long and Sedley, The 
Hellenistic Philosophers, p. 317. 
 
21 Donald Robertson, Stoicism and the Art of Happiness (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 2013). 
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of human agency, and thus to limit the range of things that are, on 
Epictetus’s view, “up to us.”  
 What should the neo-Stoic view of eudaimonia be, given our 
growing understanding of the various factors that inform and influence 
our value judgments? Pigliucci thinks we can easily avoid the first 
problem by restricting the scope of human agency to, and thus 
grounding eudaimonia on, those things only “which we completely 
control,” while “the rest should be accepted with equanimity.”22 As for 
the second problem, he points to works such as Seneca’s De Ira to 
make the case that the Stoics were well aware of the vast undercurrent 
of “instinctive reactions and automatic thoughts over which we have 
no control.”23 He thinks the Stoics may have gotten their psychology 
broadly right and cites such evidence-based approaches to 
psychotherapy as Cognitive Behavioral Therapy24 to bolster the claim 
that our best approach to a broad range of affective and cognitive states 
reflects broadly Stoic principles. 
 Of course, as framed, the dichotomy-of-control model reflects 
a moral rather than metaphysical concern: the issue is not whether 
agency and power are constitutive aspects of my nature, but whether I 
can live in a way that conforms to how nature actually is. As Zeno 
urges, for the Stoic, “the goal was to live in agreement with nature, 
which is to live according to virtue.”25 Why live in such a way? 
Because nature leads to virtue.  
Leaving virtue aside for a moment, just what it means to live in 
agreement with nature is a vexing question for the Stoic. Chrysippus 
thinks that it is a matter of living “according to experience of the things 
which happen by nature.” Diogenes takes it to mean that one should be 
                                                          
22 Pigliucci, “Toward the Fifth Stoa,” p. 24. 
 
23 Ibid., p. 26. 
 
24 Appealing to Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) to make the case for the 
viability of Stoic psychological principles assumes that CBT is indeed as 
effective as its advocates have claimed. For a different view that calls into 
question the efficacy of CBT-based therapies, or at the very least their 
superiority over other therapies, see T. Baardseth et al., “Cognitive-Behavioral 
Therapy versus Other Therapies: Redux,” Clinical Psychology Review 33 
(2013), pp. 395-405. 
 
25 Zeno, Lives of Philosophers, 7.87, in Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory 
Readings, ed. and trans. Brad Inwood and Lloyd Gerson (Indianapolis, IN, 
Hackett, 1997), p. 113. 
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“reasonable in the selection and rejection of natural things,” 
Archedemus glosses it as “to live completing all the appropriate acts,” 
and Antipater notes that it is best understood as “invariably and 
unswervingly to do everything in one’s power for the attainment of the 
principal natural things.”26 All of this is just another way of saying that, 
as Seneca puts it, what is best in us is our reason, “which when right 
and perfect makes the full sum of human happiness.”27 Only when such 
reason is perfected can it truly be said that we have attained that which 
is within our power: the perfect reason that the Stoic calls virtue. 
 However, as should be clear by now, our conception of nature 
in general––and human nature in particular––has evolved to the point 
that “living according to nature” is too vague and confusing an 
injunction to provide a useful guide to daily life. The new sciences of 
human nature may tell us what comes to us naturally given current 
understanding of the function of chromosomes and neurotransmitters, 
but they cannot tell us why we find it reasonable to care for things 
seemingly beyond our control, such as the health of the environment, 
far-away political conflicts, or the welfare of seniors. Nor can it tell us 
why we often embrace ways of being and living that sacrifice short-
term comfort for long-term gains (e.g., serving in the military, joining 
the Peace Corps, volunteering for Mars One). Most importantly, it 
cannot tell us why so much of life’s accomplishments comes out of 
frustrating natural drives and instincts that have seemingly no specific 
genetic basis or evolutionary logic. As Louis Menand put it some time 
ago in a review of Steven Picker’s The Blank Slate, “To say that music 
is the product of a gene for ‘art-making,’ naturally selected to impress 
potential mates . . . is to say absolutely nothing about what makes any 
particular piece of music significant to human beings. No doubt 
Wagner wished to impress potential mates; who does not? It is a long 
way from there to ‘Parsifal.’”28  
 Leaving aside for now the problematic aspect of moving from 
a conception of “natural” as normal or regular––“regular” in a way that 
retains enough of what Pigliucci regards as the Stoic directive to “keep 
                                                          
26 Stobaeus, Anthology, 2.75.11-76.8, in Hellenistic Philosophy, p. 211. 
 
27 Seneca, Letters, 76.9-10, in The Hellenistic Philosophers, p. 395. 
 
28 Louis Menand, “What Comes Naturally: Does Evolution Explain Who We 
Are?” The New Yorker (November 25, 2002), accessed online at: 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/11/25/what-comes-naturally-2. 
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in harmony with the Logos”29––to that of “natural” in the sense of right 
or proper, the Stoic cannot plausibly argue that we naturally evolve to 
act both in a self-interested manner and that our intentions to act this 
way are rationally motivated.30 The starting point for Stoic ethics may 
have been the concept of “familiarization” (oikeiôsis), which captures 
the sense of self-preservation and sociability that is indispensable to 
living well. It should be obvious that this capacity to be at home in the 
world, which for the Stoic is not merely a function of survival and 
sociability, but a guiding principle of reasoned agency, cannot be 
easily reconciled, if at all, with the disenchanting picture of the world 
advanced by modern science.   
 What, then, does our scientifically informed understanding of 
human nature mean for this Stoic principle that power must figure in 
our conception of what is natural? On the one hand, the advent of 
cognitive enhancers seems to have expanded, however problematically, 
the scope of human freedom, resulting in improved memory, sustained 
creativity, and enhanced performance. On the other hand, discoveries 
in the brain and behavioral sciences seem to limit the scope of human 
freedom. More to the point, can the Stoic conception of what is within 
our power be adapted to fit our scientifically informed view of nature 
in general and of human nature in particular? I think that it can, but not 
without some costs, which may leave the modern Stoic on too shaky a 
ground for comfort. Given the extent to which the Stoic way of life 
flows from a certain conception of what is real, a revision of the latter 
is bound to affect the former, which, in turn, calls into question 
whether human nature is indeed such that we are predisposed to grasp 
“the moral point of view”31 or accept with equanimity those things that 
are seemingly beyond our control. Pigliucci is right to claim that the 
dichotomy-of-control model underscores the Stoic view that “our 
eudaimonia should depend only on things which we completely 
control, and that the rest should be accepted with equanimity.”32 What 
we can completely control nowadays, however, is no longer merely a 
                                                          
29 Pigliucci, “Toward the Fifth Stoa,” p. 23. 
 
30 A. A. Long, Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), pp. 183-84. 
 
31 Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993), p. 170. 
 
32 Pigliucci, “Toward the Fifth Stoa,” p. 24. 
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function of how we reason and what we assent to. It is also a function 
of what we have and will continue to achieve in terms of altering our 
embodied condition and enhancing our intellectual capacities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
